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Chapter 1

\' INTRODUCTION
Numerous incidents are coming to light wherein the
deaf are being deprived of the basic rights guaranteed to
all citizens in this country.

~any

Americans are being .

denied the rights to communicate, to travel freely, to ·
obtain an adequate education, to acquire respectable employment or to maintain custody of their children.

In

addition, they are often deprived of their basic right to
due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment . 1

Our legal system seems to be unaware of the plight
of the deaf in communicating with the hearing world, as
evidenced by the prevalence of cases involving injustices
to the hearing-handicapped. 2
Brutality of deaf people is more widespread than is
commonly known.

The September 18, 1967, Newsweek reported

that a deaf mute was shot by National Guardsmen during the
Detroit riots after warnings were reportedly shouted at
him.

On February 14, 1969, the Chicago Sun-Times described

an incident in which two policemen arrested and then
allegedly beat four youths who came to the rescue of a 17year-old deaf-mute being clubbed by one of the policemen
because he was unable to hear the policeman's instructions.
1

2

On June 13, 1969, the Chicago Daily News told of a young man
who, as a result of his speech impairment, was shot and
killed by two policemen.
Little has been written for the deaf that may serve
as a guide for them in handling the complexities of everyday living.

Myers presented an accounting of-- laws which

affect the deaf and reviewed areas which create the most
consternation for them.3
Myers reported that suit was filed on behalf of 184
deaf members of the Illinois Association for the Deaf
against the Chicago Superintendent of Police due to in-

.

creasing police brutality involving the hearing-impaired
population of that city. 4
-

pOL1Ce wouLa naLuraLLY

Although it was realized that the
-

exper~ence

---- some G1II~cuL~~e~

~n

interrogating such individuals, their apparent lack of
understanding of this physical handicap and its imposed communicative limitations often led to the deaf person's
inability to understand being interpreted as apparent unwillingness to cooperate.

Although some significant

attempts were made by Superintendent of Police James B.
Conlisk, very few alterations in policy seemed to filter
down to the level of actual practice.

As a result of such

injustices Myers presents a simplified version of instructions for the deaf to follow if confronted by the police. 5
The data for this publication was compiled from new9paper
reports, personal contacts and court proceedings.
Brett reported a case in which a deaf man was
,.,

3

convicted of murder on what appeared to be insufficient
evidence compounded by his inability to effectively communicate at the trial due to his handicap. 6
Myers cautions the deaf about possible underhanded
business · methods including high-pressure tactics, threats,
fraud and

which are not uncommonly -reported in
dealings with the hearing-impaired. 7
forge~y

Consumer Reports cited the case where an individual
was convicted of mail fraud in a federal court for selling
hearing aids to deaf people at prices as high as 10 times
8
those suggested by the manufacturers.
Under ancient common law, a person born deaf was
considered incapable of making a valid contract, the theory
being that such a person would be unable to comprehend the
true nature of the contract and could be

eas~ly

duped.

To

protect these people, the courts refused to enforce contracts made by them.

Although this viewpoint offered some

protection from harmful contracts, it also served to limit
their freedom in economic transactions.

They could not

enter into business, purchase land, obtain credit or even
make a will. 9
A person not born deaf but who later became so
afflicted, was often the subject of litigation, this

l~ti

gation being an attempt by others to have such a person
adjudged incompetent.
Due to the severe language deficiency of the deaf
individual, the everyday vocabulary of the hearing world

>
4

requires translation as well as interpretation in order to
be fully comprehended by the deaf. 10 This need has
led to
,
laws being instituted in some states insuring the use of an

interpreter in criminal proceedings involving a deaf defendant.

The national Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf,

recognizing its responsibilities to the deaf ; - has established procedures for educating its members through the use
of simulated trials involving both deaf litigants and attorneys.

Recently the Florida Registry of Interpreters for

the Deaf has taken the lead in implementing this program in
that state.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
-.,

The amount of data currently available for use by
attorneys in preparation of. cases for hearing-impaired
clients is seriously limited.

A compilation of precedent-

setting cases involving deaf citizens would be invaluable
to the conscientious legal counselor.

Such an up-to-date

compendium of legal information is presently nonexistent.
There is an apparent need for the deaf population
of our country to be made aware of the problems they face
in everyday living.

No recent publications are available

which inform the deaf _of these problems or of how others
have overcome similar predicaments.
In addition, no significant publications exist which
expose the apparent inequities perpetrated upon the deaf
population of this country.

The general public is ignorant

5

of these injustices in an era of unequaled civil rights
awareness.
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
The lack of information concerning these injustices
is identified as the problem; the purpose of this study is
to compile information intended to alleviate the problem.
Such data will be of considerable value to the attorney
preparing cases for the deaf, for the deaf individual himself so that he might be fully acquainted with his rights
and limitations and, finally, for the American public so
that they might be informed of the present status of our
aurally handicapped.
METHODOLOGY
All legal cases in the United States which have affected deaf or hearing-impaired persons were reviewed to
determine their judicial history and interpretation.

This

was accomplished through the extensive utilization of
Shepard's Citations, Corpus Juris Secundum and American
Jurisprudence.ll

Through the use of these legal digests

this researcher was able to obtain the primary source of
every case reported that involves deaf individuals.
All such cases conducted in . the

.

u.s.

Supreme Court

and all federal and state courts were a part of that
review.

Also included were cases found in the National

Reporter System, articles in legal periodicals and

6

annotations in the Annotated Reports System.
All such cases reviewed that seemed to be of significance to the purpose of this research now comprise an
up-to-date compendium of virtually every court case in the
United States -·affecting deaf or hearing-impaired people.
These have been assembled under such divisions as "Wills,"
"Competency as Witnesses," "Capacity to Marry" and "Child
Custody and Adoption."

·.

..·

-.

.. _,

.

:

. . ...

Chapter 2
DEAF PERSONS IN THE COURTROOM
Competency as Witnesses
The presumption of law in ancient times was that
deaf mutes, so born, were idiots which, of course, would
render them incompetent to testify [Lord Hale in his Pleas
of the Crown, 1 (Hale)

P.~.

34, 9 A.L.R. 482 (1795)].

Later, deaf persons were considered to be of limited intelligence and, therefore, were still not permitted to
.
testify as witnesses. 12

-

'

This former legal presumption of idiocy has largely,
if not errtirely, disappeared or at least has been so far
modified as to merely require that the party calling a deaf
mute as a witness show certain qualifications, such as an
understanding of the nature of an oath and sufficient intelligence to permit receiving and communicating ideas regarding fact and controversy [State vs. Howard, 118 Mo. 127, 24
S.W. 41 (1893)].
The presumption that a person deaf and mute from
birth should be deemed an idiot does not seem to prevail
in modern practice.

Now, deaf mutes are considered com-

petent witnesses when they have sufficient knowledge to
understand and appreciate the sanctity of an oath, to comprehend the facts regarding their testimony and are capable
7

8

of communicating their ideas with respect thereto [Dobbins
vs. Little Rock R. & Elec. Co., 79 Ark. 85J 95 S.W. 794J
9 A.L.R. 484 (1906); Ritchey vs. People, 23 Colo. 314, 47
Pac. 272 (1896); State vs. DeWolfJ 8 C9nn. 93 (1830), 20

Am. Dec. 90; People vs. Weston, 236 Ill . 104, 86 N.E. 188
(1908); Snyder vs. Nations, 5 Black£. 295 (1840); Skaggs
vs. State, 108 Ind. 53, 8 N.E. 695 (1886); State vs. Butler, 157 Iowa 163, 138 N.W. 383 (1912); State vs. Burns,
. 78 N.W. 681 (1899)].

. .·...~ _.

In order for a deaf person to be a competent witness, there are fundamental requirements to be fulfilled:
·· 1.

The witness must be able to understand the

questions that are put to him, and he must be able to
answer in some effective manner . . That is, he must have
!

some practical system of communication.
2.

The witness must understand the obligation of

his oath to tell only the truth.

-·

In the 1884 case of Territory vs. Duran, 3 N.M.
189, 3 Pac. 53, a deaf mute eight or nine years of age was
offered as a witness.

The court held he was not a com-

petent witness in that he had never been educated and
could not be made to understand the nature of an oath, and,
in fact, could not make himself understood except as to
most ordinary everyday wants, and then only through limited
gestures understood by his family.

In the court's dissent-

ing opinion, it was stated that the boy, who was the only
eyewitness to a murder, had clearly and unmistakably through

i

~

..

9

the use of signs and pictures identified the murderers and
showed how they had · committed the crime.

•
1

Initially, the

court allowed the testimony, although it was demonstrated
that the youth could not and did not comprehend the nature
of an oath.·

-

-

Due to this situation, an appeal resulted in

the dropping of all charges .against the defendants [Quinn
vs. Halbert, 55 Vt. 229, reprint 16 Vt. 74 (1900)].
-

:'-

-

Another similar example is cited in the case of
Pruitt vs. State, 232 Ala. 421, 168 So. 149 (1936), in
which a 14-year-old deaf girl was an eyewitness to a murder
committed by her father.

Upon examination through an inter-

preter it was found that she knew who God was, she knew what
it was to pray and that she knew what it was to tell the
truth.

She did not know what sin was, did not know where

hell was nor did she know what becomes of bad little girls.
The defendant objected, stating that under these circumstances she did not know the meaning and obligation of an
oath and, therefore, should not be permitted to testify.
The Alabama Supreme Court held that there was no error in
permitting her to testify and that she was a competent
witness.
When a deaf witness has an adequate method of
communication and understands the obligation of an oath, it
is now firmly established that the witness is competent to
testify.
The Supreme Court of Iowa said in the case of State
vs. Butler, 157 Iowa 163, 138 N.W. 283 (1912):

'!

,A

10

"

The suggestion that the deafness of
Mrs. Atherton rendered her incompetent to
testify is without merit. Even a deaf mute,
if of sufficient mental capacity and able to
communicate his ideas by signs or in writing,
is a competent witness. (Cases cited.)
Th~

_fa.ct that difficulty accompanies the examina-

tion of a deaf mute is no reason for excluding _his testimony [Ritchey vs. People, 23 Colo. 314, 47 Pac. 272 (1896);
Burgess vs. State, 256 Ala. 5, 53 So. 2d 568 (1951)].

In

the latter case, the defendant, Burgess, had been dating a
deaf girl.

The girl's father objected, and Burgess

murdered the father in the presence · of the girl..

The girl

testified at the trial as an eyewitness against Burgess,
using a system of signs that were understood only by her

-- - ___ ._._ .

..... .........

_ _ ..J _,...
____
",__~
~ ,

,., . . . ~T.; ~ I"'Y>
- - .~ ---o

~

"

---

to cross-examine the witness properly under these circumstances, but the Alabama Supreme Court held against him,
citing the opinions of two experts plus several cases.
The general rule regarding evidence of the good
reputation of a witness for truth and veracity is that it
is inadmissible for the purposes of supporting his testimony.

The rule has been held inapplicable in at least one

instance, where the witness was a deaf mute [Kirby vs.
State (Okla.), 220 Pac. 74 (1923), 33 A.L.R. 1212, 58 Am.
Jur. 742, Evidence, Sec. 812].

In this case, evidence

attesting to the good reputation of a deaf and mute witness was found to be acceptable.

11
Methods of Testifying
It has been held that the testimony of a deaf person
may be obtained by any means that are necessary to that end
[State vs. Howard, 118 Mo. 127, 24 S.W. 41 (1893)].
There are generally two methods that can be used to
· take the test.i mony of a deaf person in court ;--(1) by
submitting the questions to the witness in writing and
having the witness answer them in writing, and (2) by
using the sign language of the deaf and having an interpreter to translate the signs.

(Language of signs in this

context means natural and arbitrary gestures plus the
manual alphabet or fingerspelling.)
If no interpreter is available, it may be necessary
to have the questions and answers put in writing.

However,

this is a very time-consuming process, and the courts are
usually reluctant to spend the required hours to conduct
this type of examination.

This method of examination also

gives the witness an unusually large amount of time to
consider his answers to the questions.

For this reason, it

is particularly unsuitable -for cross-examination.
Moreover, a deaf person's ability to express himself in
writing may be very limited.
For all of these reasons, it is generally
considered preferable to conduct the examination in the
language of signs through the use of an interpreter.

This

method of examination is much faster and, if a properly
qualified interpreter is used, it almost always produces

~

.

12
better results.
In English law, it has been said that it would seem
to be better, in the case of a deaf and mute witness who
can read and write, to conduct his examination in writing
[Morrison vs;. -·Lennard, 3 Car. and P. (Eng.) 127, (1827)].
It is within the discretion of the trial court
whether the testimony of deaf mutes shall be taken through
an interpreter, by means of signs or by means of written
question and answer [Dobbins vs. ·Little Rock R. & Elec.
Co., 79 Ark. 85, 95 S.W. 794 (1906), 9 A.L.R. 484, 53 Am.
Jur. 44, Trial, Sec. 29; Skaggs vs. State, 108 Ind. 53,

8 N.E. 695 (1886)].
-

\.;Ullll.

For example, in the case of State vs. Dewolf, 8
-- ·---- .
::;nuwn L!lat":J,J ".LO.JU), LU .till!. .uec.
~L. wao
t..ue
~u,

witness was able to express himself well in signs, but very
poorly in writing.

It was held, therefore, that it was

correct and proper to take his testimony in the language
of signs.
The courts have also held that in the absence of a
showing as to what constituted the best method of taking a
deaf mute's testimony, it will be presumed on appeal that
the trial court adopted the best method [Cleveland P. & E.
Railway Co. vs. Pritschau, 69 Ohio 43, 8 N.E. 663 (1886),
9 A.L.R. 480].

The court in the case of Bugg vs. Houlka, 122 Miss.
400, 84 So. 387 (1920), arrived at a general rule, that deaf
mutes who are competent to testify may give evidence by

13
signs, through an interpreter or in writing,

The court

further determined that once testimony is given, such testimony is not considered hearsay.
More specifically, it has been held that a deaf
mute who cari .iead and write may testify through that
medium, per the case of Ritchey vs. · People,. 23 - Colo. 314,
47 Pac. 272 (1896), in which a deaf mute was examined by
submitting to him written questions to which he replied
in writing.

The questions and answers were then read to

the jury.
The New York case of People vs. McGee, 1 Denio
(N.Y.) 19 (1874), however, stated it is not necessary that
a deaf witness be able to read and write.
The general rul·e is that evie\!Jence ot a deat mute
who can be communicated with by signs may be taken through
an interpreter who understands such signs and can interpret them to the court [Snyder vs. Nations, 5 B1ackf.
(Ind.) _295 (1840); Skaggs vs. State, 108 Ind. 53, 8 N.E.
695 (1886); State vs. Burns (Iowa), .78 N.W. 681 (1899);
State vs. Smith, 203 l1o. 695, 102 S. W. 526 (1907); Bugg
vs. Houlka, 122 Miss. 400, 84 So. 387 (1920), 9 A.L.R.
480; People vs. McGee, 1 Denio (N.Y.)_ 19 (1874); State vs.
Weldon, 39 S.C. 318, 24 L.R.A. 126, 17 S.E. 688 (1893)].
It has been held that it is permissible to take the
testimony of a deaf mute through an interpreter by signs,
although the witness may be proven capable of testifying
via written responses [Dobbins vs. Little Rock R. & Elec.

14
Co., 79 Ark. 85, 95 S.W. 794 (1906), 9 A.L.R. 484; State
vs. DeWolf, 8 Conn. · 93 (1830)].

This is at least where

there is no showing that the interpretation by signs is not
the better method [Dobbins vs. Little Rock R. & Elec. Co.,
79 Ark. 85, 95 S.W. 794 (1906), 9 A.L.R . 484].
Bugg vs. Houlka, 122 Miss. 400, 84

s;: 387

(1920),

9 A.L.R. 480, states the evidence of a deaf mute given
through an interpreter is admissible if the interpreter
understands the signs usually employed by the witness and
can properly interpret the meaning.

This was later modi-

fied somewhat in Hudson vs. Augustine's, Inc., 72 Ill. App.
2d 225, 218 N.E. 2d 510 (1966), 3la C.J.S. 224, which held
"

that a statement made by a deaf mute in sign language to a
person not an expert in sign language was inadmissible.
Rights in Criminal Cases
The use of interpreters in criminal cases has
special importance in view of the constitutional principle
that a· person accused of a criminal offense has the right
to be confronted by the persons who are to testify against
him.

The right of

confrontati~n

has always been construed

to mean that the accused person has a right to hear the
testimony of the witnesses against him.

For example, when

a defendant with normal hearing was required to sit so far
from the witness box that he could not hear the testimony,
it was held to be a violation of his constitutional rights
[State vs. Weldon, 91 S.C. 29, 74 S.E. 43 (1893); State vs.
Mannion, 19 Utah 505, 57 Pac. 542 (1899)].

15
In some jurisdictions the accused may be entitled
to have the testimony interpreted to him or to have his own
·testimony interpreted, but, in general ·, the use of and the
right to an interpreter is a matter of a trial court's discretion [23 - C~ J.S. 864, Criminal Law, Sec. 965].
The right of the accused to make a statement in his
behalf is a personal privilege.
.

~.stances

However, there are in-

in which the only means of making the statement

would be through .the voice of another, where the accused is
aurally impaired [Smithwick vs. State, 199 Ga. 292, 34 S.E.
2d 28 (1945), 23 C.J.S. 1109, Criminal Law, Sec. 1026].
It has been held that a defendant who is deaf is
entitled to have the testimony against ·him translated for
r:

'

his benefit as in the case of Terry vs. State, 21 Ala. App.
100, 105 So. 386 (1925).

A deaf mute was found guilty of

manslaughter in a trial where the request to appoint an
interpreter was denied because the defendant was not able
to furnish one.

On appeal, the court held that the de-

fendant's right under the state constitution providing that
in criminal prosecutions the accused had a right to be heard
by himself and counsel, to demand the nature and cause of
the accusation and to be confronted by the witnesses and
that he was not to be deprived of life, liberty or property
except by due process of law, was violated in not providing
the necessary means for communicating to the defendant the
nature and cause of the accusation and also the testimony
of the witnesses against him.

The court continued, the

16
physical infirmity of the defendant could not lessen his
constitutional right, and the state had to accord the means
by which he should receive all the . rights, benefits and
privileges which the constitution provided.
Sim1larly, in the case of Ralph vs. State, 124 Ga.

81, 52 S.E. 298 (1905), the Supreme Court of Georgia said:
The constitutional right of one
accused of an offense against the laws of
this State to be confronted with the wit.nesses contemplates that they shall be
examined in his presence and be subject
to cross-examination by him. Where a
defendant is deaf and cannot hear the
evidence of the witnesses for the State,
the presiding judge should permit some
reasonable mode of having their evidence
communicated to him.
The same rule was set forth in the case of Mothershead vs. King, 112 F. 2d 1104 (1940), wherein a deaf man
brought ·a petition in the federal courts complaining that

10 years previously, at the time of his criminal trial, he
had pleaded guilty to the charge against him without knowing the nature of the charge, due to the lack of an interpreter and the lack of an attorney to defend him.

The man

claimed he had never waived his right to an attorney and
that, due to the lack of an interpreter, he was not able to
understand what was being done to him.
The federal court held that if this was true he was
entitled to relief by the courts, even though a long period
had elapsed since the time of his trial.
A deaf person has a constitutional right to have an
interpreter at his criminal trial, but this constitutional

17
right can be waived by the deaf person.

It has been held

that where a deaf person did not request such an interpreter at the time of bis trial, he was deemed to have
waived it and he could not later complain about the absence
of such an ·interpreter.

In the case of Felts vs. Murphy,

201 U.S. 123, 50 L. Ed. 689 (1906), · the court- said that
although it was regrettable that the testimony was not
read nor repeated to the ·defendant, such omission did not
result in the defendant's having been deprived of liberty
without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
232

s.w.

-.

.

[See also Field vs.. State, 155 Tex. Crim. 137,

2d 717 (1950).]

. Although the deaf defendant must be afforded the
opportunity to have testimony ot Yitnesses communicated to
him, the exact manner of communication depends upon the
circumstances of the case and the discretion of the trial
judge [Ralph vs. State, 124 Ga. 81, 52 S.E. 298 (1905)].
Further, the appeals court stated that the defendant, knowing of his infirmity, had to make provision for his own
assistance and could not require the court to destroy an
orderly proceeding.

It was noted that the trial judge in

this case had allowed time and opportunity for the accused's
counsel to take down and exhibit the testimony to the
accused, and no harm had been shown to have resulted from
the method adopted.
In the case of People vs. Guillory, 178 Cal. App.
2d 854, 3 Cal. 415 (1960), 80 A.L.R. 2d 1077, where a

o~;.

I

~

I

•'

, ..

A ,_

1

.
•

~
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•

deafened defendant, in appealing conviction for bribery,
alleged he was denied due process because he could not hear
the proceedings of the trial ·.

The court held that here the

defendant was allowed to sit in the jury box in order to be
able to hear -atl connnents.

The court also said that when

the defendant appeared in court without live -catteries· in
his hearing device, any handicap he might have suffered
from his hearing loss was self-imposed and gave no ground
for complaint.
In State vs. Gayton, 221 La. 1115, 61 So. 2d 890
(1952), the defendant claimed that his deafness rendered
him incapable of understanding the nature of the proceedings against him and of assisting his counsel.

The court

held that there was no merit for his contention since at
the arraignment the judge wrote the charge on a piece of
paper, showed it to the defendant who could read, and the
defendant pointed to the words "not guilty" in response to
a request to plead.

The court based its findings on the

assumption that the defendant's hearing was sufficiently
corrected with the use of a hearing aid and since it
appeared that he and his counsel conversed in whispers
without difficulty during the trial.
A deaf mute petitioner to the Court of Appeals of
the State of Oklahoma was deemed not entitled to relief on
the contention that failure of the sentencing court to
afford him an interpreter resulted in denial of his Sixth
Amendment· right to ·e ffective assistance of counsel.

19
Conununication between the petitioner and his counsel was
allowed by submitting written questions to the accused who
answered such questions in his own handwriting [Stevens vs .
... .
Page, 420 F. 2d 933 (1969)].
-

Thus far, only three states, Tennessee, Oklahoma
and Illinois, have enacted statutes which provide an interpreter to be furnished at the cost of the court in any
criminal action involving a deaf mute defendant.13
Who Can Act as an Interpreter
It frequently happens that a deaf person involved.
in litigation will want to have a friend or relative act
as interpreter. . When such a person is about to act as interpreter in a case, the opposing party has been found to
usually object, stating that the person is not a proper
individual to act as interpreter because he is a friend of
the deaf person and, therefore, may not be impartial.

This

issue was raised in the case of State vs. Burns (Iowa), 78
N.W. 681 (1899), and the Iowa Supreme Court said, " ...
There is not a thing to show unfairness or prejudice from
the use of (this) interpreter. · Mere friendship will not
raise a presumption of prejudice."
Similarly, in the ca_se of Morse vs. Phillips
(Miss.), 128 So. 336 (1930), which involved a deaf man who
had been shot by a constable without apparent reason, the
deaf man had his daughter act as his interpreter.

It was

objected to by the other party, claiming it was improper
for a daughter to act as interpreter for her father,

20

particularly in view of the fact that the daughter herself
was also a witness in -the case.

The Mississippi Supreme

Court said, in its lengthy ruling on the question:
The simple fact that an interpreter
is a ~~lative of a party to the proceeding,
or ·of the one whose evidence he interprets,
will not render such interpreter incompetent
.... That an interpreter, otherwise unobjectionable, has testified or will testify in
the same case, does not render him incompetent .... To reject her as an interpreter
was to reject the most nearly perfect way
or means of interpreting the testimony of
the witness ....
This general rule was later evident in the case of
Burgess vs. State, 256 Ala. 5, 53 So. 2d 568 (1951),
wherein the brother of a deaf mute witness was allowed to
be the interpreter and such was held not to be in error
upon appeal.
The matter is discussed in Corpus Juris Secundum
as follows:
Furthermore, an interpreter has been
·held not to be disqualified or rendered incompetent merely because he is interested in the
outcome of the particular suit of prosecution*,
or because he is related to a party or witness
in the proceeding*, or has had friendly relations with the parties*, or because he has been
subpoenaed as a witness*, has listened to the
testimony of other witnesses in the case*, or
has, himself, testified or will testify*, or
because, in a cri~~nal case, he is a member of
the police force.
Where the court has approved the use of an interpreter who is an interested party, and the opposing side
fears the interpreter may falsely interpret the testimony,
the proper procedure is for the opposite party to secure
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their own i11terpreter who will be able to tell them if any

he translations.

mistakes are made in

Additional Criminal Mnt ters
Criminal Resp onsibility
Generally speaking, physical handicaps such as
deafness or blindness do not, . per
capacity to commit a

~~ . affect

-the

l~gal

ime [40 Am. Jur. 2d 315, Criminal

Responsibility, Sec. 23] . . It has been held that the fact
the defendant was a d gf mute is simply a circumstance to
be considered by the jury in connection with other evidence
in determining whethe . he was mentally capable of committing
the crime [Belcher vs . Commonwealth, 165 Ky. 649, 117 S.W.
455 (1915), 21 Am.
-

v..<::q.J.a.\.....J... '- y

Ju~ .

.

......

~.- v

u

Zd 111, Criminal Law, Sec. 26].

:.t nu

In determinin

1. r

~a

J.

a defendant's capacity to stand trial,

the test is whether h _ has the capacity to comprehend his
position, to underst at d the nature and object of the proceedings against him, t o conduct his defense in a rational
manner and to

coopera ~ e

[State vs. Buchanan,

with his counsel in his defense

4 Ariz. 100, 381 Pac. 2d 954 (1963);

People vs. Merkouris, 52 Cal. 2d 672, 344 Pac. 1, cert. den.
361 U.S. 943, 4 L. Ed , 2d 364, 80 Sup. Ct. 411 (1960);
People vs. Bender, 20 I ll. 2d 45, 169 N.E. 2d 328 (1960);
People vs. Burson, 11 I ll. 2d 360, 143 N.E. 2d 239 (1957);
21 Am. Jur. 2d 144, C · minal Law, Sec. 63].
This has it s r ots in an 1868 case wherein the
court held that t he o

~~

inary presumption of criminal

:.
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responsibility is reversed in the case of a deaf mute; it
is incumbent on the prosecution to prove the accused had
the capacity and reasoning sufficient to enable him to distinguish between right and wrong as to the act at the time
---

it was committed [State vs. Draper, 1 Del. (Houst.) 291

--

(1868)] .
. Failure to Reply

Failure of a defendant to reply to a statement of
.fact cannot be deemed an admission unless the statement was
- made in his hearing presence.

Such a statement, or lack of

it, is not admissible where the party was unable to hear it
as where he was deaf [Tufts vs. Charlestown, 70 Mass. (4
Gray) 537 (1855)].

The mere fact that the party was within

hearing distance of the speaker is not sufficient unless
-the situation was such that the individual must necessarily
have heard it made [Ruth vs. Rhodes, 66 Ariz. 129, 185 Pac.
2d 304 (1947); Jackson vs. Builder·s ' Woodworking Co., 91
Hun. 435, 36 N.Y.S. 227 (1895); Josephi vs. Furnish, 27
Ore. 260, 41 Pac. 424 (1915), 3la C.J.S. 1035, Evidence,
Sec. 2 95b] .
Leading Questions
The rule against asking one's own witness leading
questions is not absolute.

When the witness is a deaf mute,

the allowance of such questions on direct examination is
within the discretion of the trial judge [State vs. Burns,
78 N.W. 681 (1899)].

In the case of Alabama & Vicksburg

Ry. Co. vs. Kelly, 126 Miss. 276, 88 So. 707 (1921)
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regarding the use of leading questions, the court stated,
". ... wet h.~nk t h e recor d sows
h
h
tat
(leading questions were)

necessary in order that their minds might be directed to
the question."
Becaus-e the deaf often have a habit of saying "yes"
to questions they do not fully understand, the use of leading questions has been objected to in nearly every instance.
Deaf persons should be encouraged to tes·tify in their own
words, not merely say "yes" or "no" to leading questions,
in order to avoid possible errors due to limited language
abilities on their part.
Jury Instructions
When preparing jury instructions that apply to the
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whether or not the court should instruct the jury in a case
involving a deaf person that they must not sympathize with
the deaf person ·solely because he is deaf . . This question
was passed upon by the Michigan Supreme Court in the case
of Jakubiec vs. Hasty, 337 Mich. 205, 59 N.W. 2d 385
(1953).

In this case the plaintiff was a deaf woman who

was struck by a taxicab.

The attorneys for the taxicab

company appealed on the basis the trial judge refused to
give these instructions to the jury.

The appellate court

held the failure to give such instructions was not a reversible error and upheld the judgment for the deaf woman.
Hearing-impaired Prosecutor
A solicitor who was hard of hearing was permitted
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to stand near the witness box so long as there was no
threatening nor intimidating contact with them on his part
et al vs. State, 33 Ala. App. 323, 33 So. 2d 399
[Powell .

(1948), 23a C.J.S. 122, Criminal Law, Sec. 1087] .
.
·Heari-n g-impaired Juror
,

'

A new trial will not be granted because of the
deafness of a juror where the accused failed to examine him
~

for such when he was empaneled [U.s: vs. Baker (N.Y.)
D.C.N.Y., 24 F.

Cas~,"

para. 14,499, 3 Ben. 68; Higgins vs.

Commonwealth, 287 Ky. 767, 155 S.W. 2d 209 (1941); Drake
vs. State, 5 Tex. App. 649].
The same is true where the juror admitted a slight
deafness but .was very definite that he heard all the testimony per

~arish

vs.

~tate,

11

Ukla. cr. 4jb, l4Z

~ac.

Zd

642 (1943); 24 C.J.S. 99, Criminal Law, Sec. 1446(4).
Where the jury's verdict has been questioned because
of the admitted deafness of a juror, an appellate court has
ordinarily not disturbed the verdict and the juror has not
been declared incompetent

. [Commonw~alth

vs. Gronito, 326

Mass. 494, 95 N.E. 2d 539 (1950), 24a C.J.S. 999, Criminal
Law, Sec. 1884 (2)].
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Chapter 3
.THE DEAF AND HEARING-IMPAIRED IN CIVIL MATTERS

Competency, · In- General
A common question used by psychiatrists to judge
insanity is the question "Do you hear voices or noises
in your head?"

A person using this question may be un-

aware of the common medical condition among deaf persons
termed tinnitus.

Tinnitus results in deaf persons having

head noises similar to that of ringing bells, whistles,
buzzing or other types of noises.

A deaf person suffering

from tinnitus will probably answer such a question in the
affirma ti""'ve, and ·t he psychiatrist may c-onclude that the
deaf person has hallucinations, a serious sign of mental
illness.
The deaf are much in need of proper protection
against mistaken commitments to mental institutions, and
at present there is very little adequate protection.
If the only unusual conduct observed is that a person appears to be deaf and does not speak, this does not in
any way indicate the person is mentally incompetent or ill
[Challiner vs. Smith, 397 Ill. 106, 71 N.E. 2d 324 (1947)].
Incompetency and Guardianships
The physical condition of a person alleged to be
incompetent may be considered only insofar as it affects
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his mental condition [Fiala vs. Tomek, 164 Nebr. 20, 81

N.W. 2d 691 (1957); 41 Am. Jur. 2d 679, Incompetent Persons,
Sec. 145].

Thus the element of physical disability is in-

sufficient evidence of mental infirmity to justify appointment of a guardian unless the disabilities may be directly
concluded as being responsible for

th~ perso~~~

. to manage his property or person [39

~~.

inability

Jur. 2d 23,

Guardian and Ward, Sec. 21].
The test established in the case of In re Coburn,
165 Cal. 202, 131 Pac. 352 (1913), dealt with whether or
not the person in question is able, unassisted, to properly
manage to take care of. himself and his property, and by
reason thereof would be likely to be deceived or imposed
upon by artful or designing persons.

The court upheld the

constitutionality of this definition of incompetency,
stating that in the final analysis, a person's mental disability must be based upon his conduct, actions and statements in connection with surrounding circumstances and
conditions.
In the case of In

~Guardianship

of Eleanor Frank,

137 N.W. 2d 219 (1965), 9 A.L.R. 3d 764, the question of
the woman's incompetency was based partly on the fact that
her IQ was tested and shown to be 67, which is just below
borderline mental retardation and is within the range of
educable mentally retarded. 15 In her physical examination
it was found she was suffering from some physical infirmities incident to her advanced years, such as

de~fness,

but
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there was nothing to show that the clearness of her mind had
been impaired to any substantial degree by any of these infirmities.

The issue was brought because the woman, an

elderly widow, had sold some of her property .to a favorite
son for a pr-ice below that offered by one of her daughters.
Because the woman had deliberately refused the larger amount
of money, the daughter attempted to prove her mother incompetent to handle her affairs.

The court relied on the

established definition of competency, stating that incompetency is not shown by the refusal of an offer of more
money if the seller's preference is to deal with another
individual, regardless of the price.
It was specifically held by the New York courts in
case OI
-

~ne

~rower

vs.

4 donns
-

~1~ner,

a

~n.

q4L

•

-

- - -

•

~~ov~J,

-

~naL

the fact a person is a deaf mute is insufficient grounds in
itself for the appointment of a· guardian.
Capacity to Make Contracts
Under ancient common law a deaf mute was considered
incapable of making a valid contract, on the theory that
such a person would be unable to comprehend the true nature
of the contract and could be easily deceived into entering
into contracts harmful to him.
The courts have since adopted the opposite theory,
and now hold that contracts entered into by such persons
are valid, as in the case of Alexier vs. Matzke, 151 Mich.
36, 115 N.W. 251 (1908).

Here, a man 27 years old, who had

been deaf since the age of three, entered into a written
J
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contract in which he agreed to do manual labor in exchang·e
for room, board and other services, but without monetary
remuneration.

After working many years, the deaf man

brought suit against his employer for the value of the work
he had done, claiming he had not really understood the

terms of the contract.

The jury found in his - favor, and

the employer appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court on the
ground the contract was binding upon the deaf man.

Th·e ap-

pellate court held the man had ordinary intelligence and
the terms of the contract had been made reasonably clear
to him before he signed it.

He was, therefore, bound by

the contract and was not allowed to recov.e r from.

t ~e

em-

ployer.
Such persons may also mak.e a valid co veya
property where the nature of the transactio
strument signed are understood by the i di
Brown vs.

Bro~m,

ua

er

3 Conn. 299 (1820).

In the case of Selanak vs. Se anak
399 (1909), a deaf man worked for many

5

ears f r a c · se

relative without pay except for his roo

a

a number of years, he sued for the value

had done.

f

, he · -

a
1.

c ~e

ar
f t ·e

ere a

The court explained that

er

r
0

e
s

work for a member of the family, t ' ere is a
that the work was done free of charge, as a g· f ' .
But in this case, the deaf
as a member of the family, havi g

a

ee

a

barn among other ill-treat e t ace r e

e

e

ee
i

rea e

e

29
Appellate Court, therefore, held that the usual rule did
not apply and the man was entitled to recover the value of
the work he had done.
The fact a deaf person cannot hear nor speak does
not in

itself - ~revent

binding contract.

him from entering into a legally

In the case of Russell vs: Rutledge, 158

Ill. App. 259 (1910), the court held that a valid contract
could be made through the action of a deaf individual
merely nodding his head in consent.
The case of Fewkes vs. Borah, 376 Ill. 596, 35 N.E.
2d 69 (1941), dealt with a man of 75 years who had been
deaf all his life and had lived alone.

Two men came to his

house ·and induced him to sign an oil lease on certain real
estate that he own-e a.

1n

-court, -n e

test:l.I~ea

ne cou1.a reaa

the lease but not the small print, that he did not understand what he was signing and that he signed only because
he was afraid of the men.
· The Illinois Supreme Court ruled in favor of the
deaf man, stating, "There is, however, sufficient evidence
of plaintiff's infirmity to require that those dealing with
him use utmost good faith.u

This case established the prin-

ciple still in use today requiring persons engaged in business with the deaf to use "utmost good faith."
In the case of Collins vs. Trotter, 81 Mo. 275
(1889), the Supreme Court of Missouri set a different precedent in an effort to protect deaf persons from the consequences of contracts entered into by them.

In this case
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two deaf persons had signed a promissory note, and when
sued on the note, contended they were incompetent to defend
themselves in court due to their disabilities.

A petition

was filed to have a guardian appointed for them to defend
them in the ligitation.

The court stated the burden of

showing the defendants' competency was on the--plaintiffs,
and, since the plaintiffs had failed to prove this at the
trial, the note was held to be invalid.
These cases show there are three different viewpoints applied by courts to the issue of contracts made by
deaf persons:
1.

That deaf persons are fully competent and will

be held to the contracts in the same manner as those possessing normal hearing.
2.

That those dealing with a deaf person must use

good faith.
3.

That those suing a deaf person have the burden .

of proving the deaf person was competent to enter into a
contract.
The first viewpoint is the one followed most frequently.

It would appear that contracts cannot be voided

merely because the person is deaf.
It is generally not a defense for a deaf person to
say that he looked over a contract but did not actually
read it.

If the contract was put before him and he knew

how to read, it is his responsibility to read it before
signing.
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Moreover, it is generally not a defense for a deaf
person to say he read a document and does not understand

it.

As in the case of normal-hearing persons, it is assumed

that when a person reads a document and does not understand
it, it is his -responsibility ·to obtain legal advice before

--

signing.

Most persons who are deaf from early childhood are
educated at special state schools for the deaf, wherein
they spend most of their time in a carefully protected
environment where fair and proper treatment is the rule.
Upon completion of their education, and upon their
entrance into the outside business world, such persons are
apt to assume the same kind of considerate treatment will
still prevail.

It is important, theretore, that their

education include some special counseling, advising them
never to sign an important · document without observing utmost caution in so doing.
It is extremely doubtful that, at the present time,
a court would impute

i~competency

to a deaf mute in view of

the remarkable achievements. recorded by persons thus afflicted and the vast strides in technology in perfecting
aids for lessening the disabilities incidental to deafness as well as to muteness [41 Am. Jur. 2d 612, Incompetent Persons: Contracts and conveyances, Sec. 73].

It

has been stated, however, that a mental disability coupled
with both physical disability, such as deafness, and advanced age can constitute sufficient proof of lack of
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capacity to make a contract per Kvale vs. Kean e' 39 N. D.
560, 168 N.W. 74 (1918), 9 A.L.R. 972.

Capacity to Marry
The court in Johnson vs. Johnson (N.D.) 104 N.W.
2d 8 (1916), - fr~A.L.R. 2d 1029, adopted the rule that the
best accepted test as to whether there is mental capacity
sufficient to contract a valid marriage in the case of deaf
persons, is whether or not there is a capacity to understand the nature of the contract and the . duties andresponsibilities which it creates.
In the case of

In~

Smith, 27 Ohio 533 (1927),

the marriage was considered valid so long as both parties
had the understanding and mental capacity to realize what
was being done ana consent1ng tnereto.
This standard has its roots in an early English
case [Harrod vs. Harrod, 1 Kay and J. 4, 69 Eng. Reprint
344 (1854), 52 Am. Jur. 2d 879, Marriage, Sec. 18], wherein
the woman who was alleged mentally incompetent to contract
marriage had been deaf and mute from childhood.

The court

commented, "This person was deaf and dumb and that her mind
was, in that sense, dull, even perhaps more so than the
minds of persons who are afflicted by these calamities
generally are, it seems not to have been in any degree unsound.

It is clearly the law that the presumption is

always in favor of sanity, and there is no exception to
this rule in the case of a deaf and du~b person.

But the

onus of proving the unsoundness of the mind of such a
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person must rest on those who dispute her sanity.

There is

nothing in our experience which would lead us to conclude
,

that the deaf and dumb are generally of unsound mind."
It has since been said that the mental strength required for the .. transaction of business is not necessary to
enable the party to contract a marriage, although he must
be capable of_ understanding the nature of the contract
[Flynn vs. Troesch, 373 Ill. 275, 26 N.E. 2d 91 (1940)].
The court further stated that if a person has sufficient
mental capacity to enter into general contracts, it seems
he has sufficient mental capacity to enter into a contract
to marry.

It was thus declared by the court that it need

not determine the issue of whether less mental capacity is
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contract generally.

The ruling of the court in Forbis vs. Forbis (Mo.
App.), 274 S.W. 2d 800 (1955), established that no greater
mental capacity is required to make bindi g a

atrimonial

contract than other business contracts.
Wills
Capacity to Make
The general principle regar

~

e

a a i

y of
ill

deaf persons to make wills is that

].

[Potts vs. House, 6 Ga. 324 (18

as

This is generally based
de a

been accomplished in the educat·
mute, and such important positions

~

and

e, i dustry,
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commerce and statesmanship are filled by men and women who
are deficient or entirely devoid of the sense of sight,
hearing or speech that a court would cast reproach upon itself to hold that they are incapable of making wills merely
because of the deficiency [57 Am. Jur. 86, Wills, Sec. 72].
There are, however, at least three cases on record
in which wills made by deaf persons were declared invalid
because of the physical handicap of the deaf person.
the case of Payton vs.

Shi~ley,

In

80 Okla. 145, 195 Pac. 125

(1921), the deaf person had never attended school and had
only very crude methods of indicating his ideas.

It had

been held in an earlier case that this particular man was
i ncapable of making a deed.

The Oklahoma Supreme. Court

h eld that under the circumstances he lack ed capacity to
make a will and, therefore, the document h e ha d execu ted
was declared invalid.
In a similar case, Rollwagen vs. Rollwagen, 63
N.Y. 504, the New York Supreme Court held invalid a wi ll
made by an illiterate, partly paralyzed
was so defective that only one perso

an whose speech

clai ed to be able

to understand him, and where t he circums ances surrounding
the execution of the will were sus ic _
In the case of In ~ Ferr1s'

5·

1 . 708

115, 169 Atl. 697, aff. 117 N.J. Eq.
(1934), a lawyer wrote a will for a

J. Eq.

e

1

asked her in written question s if she agree
and if she wished the witnesses to attest

1t.

eaf woman and

to the will
She nodded
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her head affirmatively, and the witnesses then signed the
will.

However, the written questions had been shown only

to the woman and not to the witnesses.

The New Jersey

courts held the will was invalid because the witnesses did
not fully understand what the woman was agreeing to.

The

court held that the written questions should have been
shown to the witnesses.
In general, courts rule that deaf persons are
-

usually capable of making valid wills.

The courts may re-

quire more proof than usual to show that the deaf individual understood what he was doing and that he executed the
.

-

will of his own free choice [Lane vs. Lane, 95 N. Y. 494].
Capacity to Witness
It was held in the case of Succession of Beattie,
163 La. 831, 112 So. 802 (1927), that a deaf person is not
a competent witness to the signing of a will of another
person.

The reason in this case was that the law required

the person making the will acknowledge to the witnesses
that he intended the document to be his will, and the deaf
person is unable to hear this statement.
In view of all other principles of law which have
been established regarding the capacity of deaf persons , it
would reasonably follow that a deaf person would be a competent witness to a will if the acknowledgment by the person
making the will were communicated to the deaf witness in
writing or in some other manner.
The State of Louisiana is the only state having ·a
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statute specifically stating that deaf persons are incompetent witnesses to wills. 16
Injuries by Automobiles and Highway Traffic to Deaf Persons
A considerable number of cases involving deaf
pedestrians who\Nere struck by automobiles or other vehicles
have been litigated in various - state supreme -courts.

These

generally involve deaf persons who failed to hear an automobile horn and were struck from behind.
The case of Crawley vs. Jermain, 218 Ill. App. 51
(~920),

involved a woman who could not hear and who also

had a severe visual problem.

While walking along a side-

walk, she crossed the defendant's driveway.

The defendant

had been backing his car out of the driveway and had honked
n1s norn

~o

warn

peaes~r1ans.

~ne

horn and was struck and injured.

woman

a~a

.

-

noc near cne

The driver contended he

was not responsible for her injuries because he had blown
his horn, and he had no way of knowing that the woman was
deaf.

The court held that the woman had a perfect right to

assume the sidewalk was safe for her to walk upon and that
it was as safe for a deaf and nearsighted person as it was
for those whose faculties of sight and hearing were normal,
and, additionally, it was incumbent upon the driver to proceed across the sidewalk cautiously so as to avoid running
over pedestrians rightfully proceeding upon it.
In the case of Furtado vs. Bird [26 Cal. App. 152,
-

146 Pac. 58 (1915)], a deaf man was riding a horse along a
road.

A man driving his car down the road honked his horn
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when he was a short distance away from the deaf man, who
did not hear the horn.

The horse and deaf rider were

struck by the automobile, and the driver claimed that the
deaf man was partly responsible because he failed to look
in both direc·ti.ons.
The California Appellate Court said: -(The driver} contends that (the deaf
man) was guilty of contributing to his injury
because, being hard of hearing, it was his duty
to look back as well as forward, and that, if
he had been doing so, this accident would not
have occurred. We do not think it was (the
deaf man's) duty to be constantly looking back.
Both parties had an equal right to the use of
the road, but . (the driver) was in a better
position to avoid a collision, and, when he
observed that (the deaf man) appeared not to
hear the horn, it was (the driver's) duty to
slow down, and even to stop his car if necessarv to avoid runnin~ a~ainst (the deaf man's)
horse.
In a number of cases in which verdicts in favor of
deaf pedestrians were issued, the courts pointed out a deaf
pedestrian is called upon to use those unimpaired senses
with a higher degree of alertness than would be the case if
his senses were all normal [Foster vs. Cumberland County
Power & Light Co., 116 Maine 184, 100 Atl. 833 (1917),
L.R.A. 1917e 1044].
In the case of Wilson vs. Freeman, 271 Mass. 438,
171 N.E. 469 (1930),

~he

court held in favor of a deaf

pedestrian who was struck from behind by a truck.

In dis-

cussing the degree of care required by the deaf man, the
court stated:
The deafness of the plaint iff did not
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deprive him of the rights of a traveler. That
infirmity required increased and commensurate
circumspection on his part in order to attain
the standard of conduct established by the law
for everybody.
.
.....
Similarly, in the case of Robb vs. Quaker City Cab
:

Co., 283 Pa \ 454, 129 Atl. 331 (1925), the court, in holding in favor of a deaf man hit by a cab while_crossing the
street, said:

..

Plaintiff was a deaf mute requiring
more care on his part but did not of itself
convict him of negligence in attempting to
cross the stre t. A citizen's right upon
the public highway does not depend upon his
ability to hear, so long as he makes proper
use of his sight.
A number of cases adjudicated in state supreme
courts have also been decided against deaf pedestrians.
"'9"
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140 Atl. 751 (1928), a 58-year-old hard-of-hearing male. was
walking down a street that had no sidewalks.

He walked

close to trolley tracks in the street and was struck by
a trolley car from behind.

The Connecticut Supreme Court

held that he could not recover because he had not exercised proper care for his own safety.

He knew he was deaf

and would not be able to hear a trolley bell, and, therefore, he should not have walked near the tracks.
Similarly, in the case of Hizam vs. Blackman, 103
Conn. 547, 131 Atl. 415 (1926), a deaf man crossing the
street at night was struck by an automobile which he had
neither seen nor heard.

The court held that he could

easily have seen the car if he had looked, and since he
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had failed to do so, he could not recover damages.
Where a deaf pedestrian is struck by an emergency
vehicle such as an ambulance, police car or fire truck, it
is generally held to be a question for the jury as to
whether the de·a-f -person was exercising proper care for his
own safety in view of his handicap [McCullough- vs. Lalumiere, 156 Maine 479, 166 Atl. 2d 702 (1960) (police car);
Goodrich vs. Cleveland, 15 Ohio App. 15 (1875), Fink vs.
New York, 206 Misc. 79, 132 N.Y.S. 2d 172 (1954), (fire
truck)].
The general principles are well summarized in The
Handbook on the Law on Torts, which states:
The man who is ... deaf ... is entitled to
1
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standards .... At the same time, his conduct must
be reasonable in the light of his knowledge of
his infirmity.!!
Driving Privileges
Deaf persons frequently use their automobiles even
more than persons of normal hearing since a deaf person may
not be able to use a telephone, causing him to do much of
his business in person.
Deaf drivers have been found to have better driving
records than hearing motorists.

The driving records of 100

Colorado deaf drivers were compared with two groups each of
100 average-hearing drivers of that state, and it was found
there were 54 per cent fewer moving violations in the deaf
p~pula~i~n than in Gr~up A ~f ~h~ hearing drivers and 113

per cent fewer violations than in Group B.

18
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In Kentucky, motor vehicle administrators indicated
that during a five-year period, no deaf drivers had been
I

called for a hearing preliminary to revocation of a driver's
license. 19
A

surv~y _

of hearing-impaired drivers in Wisconsin

found they had a comparatively low rate of accident involvement and that no deaf person in the seven years prior
to the survey had been involved in a fatal traffic accident.

20

A survey undertaken by the National Association of
the Deaf disclosed that, compared to overall accident rates,
drivers who were not deaf had more than four times as many
accidents per year as deaf drivers. 21
•
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million drivers revealed that the deaf driver is likely to
be the safest and most careful driver. 22
It has been specifically held that licensed drivers
with impaired hearing have a right to drive, per Dillenschneider vs. Campbell (Mo.), 350 S.W. 2d 260 (1961), 60a
C.J.S. 115, Motor Vehicles, Sec. 692.

This case also

established that the motorist was not guilty of negligence
as a matter of law simply because he was a deaf mute, nor
was his passenger guilty of contributory negligence simply
because she rode as a · p~ssenger in an automobile driven by
a deaf mute.
The operator of a motor vehicle cannot claim exemption from the consequence of an accident caused by his
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unskillfulness in handling his vehicle upon the ground that
his physical deficiencies handicapped him [Roberts vs. Ring,
143 Minn. 151, 173 N.W. 437 (1919), 8 Am. Jur. 2d 243,
Automobiles, Sec. 692; Atkinson vs. Cardinal State Lines
Co. , 148 Kan. 24·4~ 80 Pac. 2d 107 3 (1938)] .
In the Atkinson vs. Cardinal State Lines Co. case,
the question of contributory negligence was again considered.

It appeared that a bus driver who attempted to

overtake an auto driven by the plaintiff, a deaf mute, attempted to apply his air brakes when he saw two cars
approaching his bus from the opposite direction.

When the

brakes failed to respond, he sounded his horn repeatedly,
but the plaintiff made no response to the sound of the
horn.

The plaintiff's car was hit twice by the bus, caus-

ing the plaintiff to lose control of his car and resulting
in injury to the deaf man.

Upon appeal, the court af-

firmed the judgment for the plaintiff.
point, however, of stating that the

The court made a

q~estion

of whether

the plaintiff's failure to hear the horn was the· cause of
the accident was an issue to be determined by a jury and
that this decision for the plaintiff did not necessarily
set a precedent in favor of deaf drivers.
If a driver's hearing is impaired, he is nevertheless required to hear, at his peril, that which a normal
driver would hear, per Bull vs. Drew, 286 App. Div. 1138,
146 N.Y.S. 2d 85, reh. denied 1 App. Div. 2d 793, 149
N.Y.S. ·2d 235 (1956).
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If the driver is deaf, there is an increased duty
upon him to keep a sharp lookout as in approaching railroad
crossings upon which he knows trains often pass [Penn vs.
Pearce, 121 Fla. 3, 163 So. 288 (1935)].
Contributory negligence of a partially deaf person
was held to exist in Dardenne vs. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co.,
13 La. App. 262, 127 So. 458 (1930), wherein the plaintiff's partial deafness caused him not to hear the whistle
and sound of the bell of an approaching railroad train, and
the court held that he clearly contributed to the accident
by his carelessness in not exercising more care in crossing
the railroad tracks.

The court said that the fact he suf-

fered with this infirmity demanded the exercise of care of
commensurate degree.
Many states have a question on the driver's license
application form similar to "Do you have any physical
handicap which would affect your ability to drive safely?"
Deaf persons sometimes read this question as if it said
"Do you have any physical handicap? ," omitting the qualifying phrase" ... which would affect your ability to drive
safely."

If the question is misread

deaf person may answer "yes," and be a

s manner , the

t

1. ·

at1..cally dis-

·t

qualified from obtaining a driver 's lice ·e
The State of Florida enacted a

a~

1971 which

allows deaf persons the right to have an interpreter with
•
f or a dr~ver
•
I
them at the time of app 1 icat~on
s 1•J.cense. 23
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Applications for Insurance
When an application for an insurance policy is
being filled out, the insurance agent generally asks questions of the person to be insured and then writes the
answers on the application form.

After completing the

forms, the client is asked to sign the application.

If

the client involved is deaf, the agent may misunderstand
the answers to his questions and thus write down something
incorrect; similarly, the deaf person may misinterpret the
agent's questions and give an incorrect response.
In the case of Colaneri vs; General Accident
Assurance Corp., Ltd., 126 App. Div. 591, 110 N.Y.S. 678
(1888), the New York Supreme Court ruled in favor of the
insurance company.

In this case, a deaf man who could not

read, filled out the application form with the help of the
insurance agent.

The papers contained the statement nthe

applicant has never received any injury or suffered from
any disease or sickness of any kind."

Actually, the in-

sured had suffered from ear trouble prior to that time.
After the policy was issued, he again suffered from the ear
pathology and filed a claim on his health insurance policy
which the company refused to pay due to the false statement on his application.
The case of Inter-Ocean Casualty Co. vs. Ervin, 229
Ala. 352, 156 So. 844 (1934), involved a deaf woman who
took out an insurance policy naming her brother, who was
also deaf, as beneficiary.

Soon after, she had an accident
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and died.

The insurance company refused to pay on the

policy because the application form contained the statement
"Neither my hearing nor vision is impaired."

'

At the trial

it was proven that neither .of the deaf persons was able
to read, and they· did not know the agent had allowed this
statement to remain in the application form. ·- The Alabama
Supreme Court held the beneficiary was entitled to recover
on the policy in spite of the incorrect statement in the
application.

This falls back to the ·principle regarding

contracts wherein those dealing with deaf persons are required to use utmost good faith .
In the case of Follete vs. Mutual Accident Insurance Co., 110 N.C. 377, 14 S.E. 923 (1892), a deaf man
bought an

acc~aen~

poL~cy

~n

wn~cn

~ne

~nsurance

agenL

failed to put the fact of deafness down on the application
form.
to pay.

When the man was later injured, the company refused
The North Carolina Supreme Court refused to allow

the insurance company to escape liability in this manner
and included in its ruling a strongly worded opinion regarding
the questionable business practices of the company.
The conclusion that can be drawn from these cases
is that a deaf person should be careful to see that the insurance application clearly states that he is deaf, and
that no incorrect statements appear in the application
which may have been caused by any misunderstanding.

Where

a false statement is discovered, the insurance company
should be immediately informed of the error so that it
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cannot later be used as a defense for not paying a claim on
the policy.
Where a false statement has been made in an insurance
application, · the courts frequently hold that the insurance
company cannot -·avoid making payment that is due on the
policy unless they can show that the false s -tatement materially affected the risk that was assumed by the company.

In

other words, the court may hold that the misstatement must
be proven to be material and significant in character.
Libel and Slander
Libel and slander are the main branches of the law
of defamation of character.

They consist of false, malicious

statements about a person which tend to injure that person
in his reputation or his business and which must be overheard and understood by a third party to be considered
defamation [SO Am. Jur. 2d, Libel and Slander, Sec. 1].
It has been argued that a defamatory statement made
in the language of signs should be classified as a libel
rather than a slander.

Since it has been held that a

motion picture may be considered to create a libel [Brown
vs. Paramount Picture Corp., 270 N.Y.S. 544, 240 App. Div.
520 (1934)], it is argued that the use of signs, which consist of actions or pictures, should likewise be classified
as libel.

This line of argument follows the theory that a

libel is something visual that can be seen by the human eye
[50 Am. Jur. 2d, Libel and Slander, Sec. 4].
since the language of signs

i~

Therefore,

visual in nature, it should
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be considered a libel.

The general principles on this sub-

ject are still in a state of flux.24
Child Custody and Adoption· ·
It has been held that deafness may prevent a woman
from obtaining the-·custody of her children, and that they
may be better off in a public institution than- living with
their mother.

This unusual decision was reached in the

case of Howard vs. Ragsdale (Ky.), 249 S.W. 2d 154 (1952).
In this case, a husband .and wife had three children, all
under the age of 10.

When the parents separated, the

children were placed in a public institution.

The deaf

mother later brought a legal proceeding to secure their
release from the institution and to obtain custody.

The

court stated the children had lived in the institution for
five years, that they were doing well there and that the
mother was a deaf mute who lived with other deaf mutes.
The court held it would not return these children to their
mother because they would be placed in a completely different and strange environment and would have great difficulty in living and communicating with deaf mutes.

The

children were, therefore, left in the public institution.
It would seem that a great deal of effort must be
made to educate the courts as to the capabilities of deaf
parents.

This can be done through the testimony of expert

witnesses who are familiar with the education and upbringing of children by deaf parents.

Experts on this subject

can be located through such organizations for the deaf as
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Gallaudet College in Washington, D.C. (the only institution
of higher learning in the world exclusively for . the deaf),
the American Hearing Society, the National Association of
the Deaf, the Association of American Instructors of the
Deaf, the Counci-l -of Organizations Serving the Deaf and the
U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare.
A long and bitter battle by a deaf couple for the
adoption of a newborn infant. began in 1966 in the California case of In

~

Adoption of Scott James Richardson,

251 Cal. App. 221 (1966).
The deaf couple, Wayne and }1adeline Christensen,
had been married 17 years, and the husband had been employed at the same job for 11 years; they had ample insurance, a large equity in a new three-bedroom home, two
automobiles and a savings account.

The husband had been

a licensed driver for 28 years, and both were active
members and officers of their church.

In due course, a

baby from an unwed mother was placed in the Christensen
home; the Adoption Bureau investigated and approved the
home and the parents.
in order.

The medical report on the child was

Without warning, the judge in the Los Angeles

County Superior Court questioned whether the court was
doing right by giving a healthy, normal child to handicapped people, and therefore would not allow the adoption
proceedings to continue.
A continuance was obtained to a new court date at
which time 17 expert witnesses testified in favor of the
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adoption, all to no avail.

Hundreds of affidavits, letters

and newspaper articles favored the adoption.

The only op-

position came from the judge, who subsequently was discovered to have written, five months prior to the court
hearing, "I pelieve ... this adoption should be nipped in the
bud .... In my opinion, we are not doing right in ... approving
an adoption to 'deaf-mutes' (sic). '" 25
The Christensens appealed and eventually won a new
adoption hearing, the appellate court saying the judge (1)
was biased and prejudiced because of the deafness of the
parents, (2) grossly abused his discretion, (3) acted beyond the jurisdiction of a statute, and (4) violated the
"Due Process" and "Equal Protection" clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Costitution.

The new judge

approved the adoption of the infant, after 18 months of
litigation.
A sidelight in this case is that the infant has
since been diagnosed as having a severe hearing loss in one
ear and some impairment in the other ear.

This condition

.
d 26
had existed since birth, but on 1y recent 1y was d ~scovere
.
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Chapter 4
SUMMARY

It has , been shown through extensive research that
there is a serious deficiency in the amount

Q~ _ available

data concerning the many difficulties encountered by the
deaf and hearing-impaired.

Such data, if made available,

could be utilized by attorneys in preparation of cases for
clients so afflicted.

The deaf population of our country

has also displayed an apparent need for information of this
kind, containing advice and counseling for them in how to
cope with everyday problems.
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The ignorance of

the public is certainly one of the reasons for these apparent injustices.
The purpose of this study was to accumulate information, which could be transposed into any of the above
three informational formats.

The research which achieved

this objective was accomplished

thro~gh

the utilization of

three legal digests, Shepard's Citations, Corpus Juris
Secundum and American Jurisprudence.

The attempt was made

to review every legal case in the United States' judicial
history which has affected or involved deaf or hearingimpaired individuals.
49

50

The researched cases were divided into two main
categories, courtroom matters and civil matters, with

)

several subheadings such as competency as a witness, methods
of testifying, incompetency and guardianships and capacity
to make

contra~ts.

Although only three states have enacted statutes
guaranteeing the furnishing of an interpreter at the cost
of the court in criminal action involving a deaf litigant,
it would appear that a deaf person in any state requesting
this service would be accorded the same right.

This sup-

position is based upon two areas of established law.
First, where a person who speaks a foreign language
to the exclusion of a clear understanding of English, appears in a court

act~on,

an

~nterpreter

oi

~nat

Iore~gn

language is provided by the court. - ·
Additionally, there is a steady trend toward
broadening the rights of indigent persons appearing before
the bench.

It has been determined that indigents, in the

constitutional guarantee of due process, may be represented
by legal counsel, provided a complete copy of the transcript of trial proceedings for appeal purposes and even
offered investigative services, again for appeal purposes,
all at no cost to such individuals.

It logically follows

that indigent deaf persons have the same rights to due
process including, in their case, interpreters in judicial
proceedings.
The outrageous mistreatment of hearing-handicapped
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persons described herein in Chapter 1 serves as proof that
such persons are commonly discriminated against in the
everyday world.

If such individuals attempt to seek legal

recourse for these abuses, their hands are, in effect, tied
at the door to - ·the courthouse as evidenced by the information found in Chapter 2 regarding courtroom matters.

The

civil matters detailed in Chapter 3 offer further support
of the charges claiming unfair practices in matters involving deaf persons.
Upon final review of the cases cited herein, it is
concluded that because of the severe communication problems
of the deaf and hearing-impaired, these persons have suffered unfairly in spite of the courts generally dec+aring
them

a~

competent:
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hardships be exposed to the general public in an effort to
lessen their occurrence, that the deaf themselves be better
educated in how to handle many of the dilemmas they may
encounter and that the legal proceedings involving these
persons be more equitably regulated.
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Appendix A
LIST OF CASES CITED
Alabama vs. Vicksourg Ry. Co.
Atkinson vs. Cardinal State Lines Co.
Beattie, In re succession of
Belcher vs~ COmmonwealth
Brower vs. Fisher
Brown vs . Brown
Brown vs. Paramount Picture Corp.
Bruce vs. State
Bugg vs. Houlka
Bull vs. Drew
Burgess vs. State
Challiner vs. Smith
Cleveland P. & E. Ry. Co. vs. Pritschau
Coburn, In re
Colaneri~s~-General Accident Assurance Corp., Ltd.
- Collins vs. Trotter
Commonwealth vs. Gronito
Crawlev vs. Jermain
Dardennc vs. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co.
Dillenschneider vs. Campbell
Dobbins vs. Little Rock R. & Elec. Co.
Drake vs. State
Felts vs. Murphy
Ferris' Will, In re
Fewkes vs. Borah
Fiala vs. Tomek
Field vs. State
Fink vs. New York
Flynn vs. Troesch
Forbis vs. Forbis
Follete vs. Mutual Accident Insurance Co.
Foster vs. Cumberland County Power & Light Co.
Frank, In re Guardianship of Eleanor
Furtadovs-.-Bird
Goodrich vs. Cleveland
Harrod vs. Harrod
Higgins vs. Commonwealth
Hizam vs. Blackman
Howard vs. Ragsdale
Hudson vs. Augustine's, Inc.
Inter-Ocean Casualty Co. vs. Ervin
Jackson vs. Builders' Woodworking Co.
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Jakubiec vs. Hasty
Johnson vs. Johnson
Josephi vs. Furnish
Kerr vs. Connecticut
Kirby vs. State of Oklahoma
Kvale vs. Keane
Lane vs. Lane
Lord Hale, Pleas of the Crown
McCullough vs. _La1umiere
Morrison vs. Lennard
Morse vs. Phillips
Mothershead vs. King
Parish vs. State
Payton vs. Shipley
Penn vs. Pearce
People vs. Bender
People vs. Burson
People vs. Guillory
People vs. McGee
People vs. Merkouris
People vs. Weston
Potts vs. House
Powell et al vs. State
Pruitt Vs. State
Quinn vs. Halbert
Ralph vs. State
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Robb vs. Quaker City Cab Co.
Roberts vs. Ring
Rollwagen vs. Rollwagen
Russell vs. Rutledge
Ruth vs. Rhodes
Sela~ak vs. Selanak
Skaggs vs. State
Smith, In re
Smi thwiCl< Vs. State
Snyder vs. Nations
State vs. Buchanan
State vs. Burns
State vs. Butler
State vs. DeWolf
State vs. Draper
State vs. Gayton
State vs. Howard
State vs. Mannion
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State vs. Weldon
Stevens vs. Page
Territory vs. Duran
Terry vs. State
Tufts vs. Charlestown
U. S . v s . Bake r
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FOOTNOTES
1 Ivan E. Lawrence, Is Justice Deaf?
(Clearwater,
Florida: Florida _R~gistry of Interpreters for the Deaf,
19 7 2) .
2 Peter Brett, The Eeamish Case

Australia: University of
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(Melbourne,
Press, 1965) ; and

Lowell J. Myers, The Law and the Deaf

(~~shington,

D.C.: U.S. Department of Health, Educa t1on and 1\elfare,

1967); and

Lawrence, Is Justice Deaf?; and
Edwin Stacey Oakes and GeorgeS. Gulick, eds.,
American Juris~rudence (Rochester, New York: Lawyers Cooperatfve PllDT1SfilngCompany, 1943); and
Oscar C. Sattinger, ed., American JurisErPdbnce (2d
series; Rochester, New York: Lawyers CooperatfVe u-flShing
rnmn'.:lnu

1 Qt;

~~

•

!:!nrl

.&.

Frances J. Ludes, ed., Corpus Juris Secundum
(Brooklyn, New York: American Law Eook Company, 1964).
3Myers, The Law and the Deaf.
4Lowell J. Myers, How to Stop Policemen from Killing
Deaf People by Mistake (Ch1cago: By the Auilior, 1060 Kest
North Shore Avenue, 1969).
SLowell J. Myers, Some of the Problems that Deaf
People Meet (Chicago: By the Author, 1969) .
6Brett, The Eeamish Case.
7Myers, Some of the Problems that Deaf People Meet.
8"The Docket", Consumer Reports, February, 1969,
p. 83.
9Lawrence, Is Justice Deaf?; and
Myers, The Law and the

~~~~;

and

Statement by George Thomas, personal interviews,
April and May, 1972.
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lOLouis M. DiCarlo, The Deaf (Englewood Cliffs, New
Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 17.
.
11 shepard's Citations (Colorado Springs, Colorado:
Shepard's Citations, Inc., 1972); and
Oakes and Gulick, eds., American Jurisprudence; and
Sattinger:· ed. , American Jurisprudence; and
Ludes, Corpus Juris Secundum.

-

12 Ronald A. Anderson, ed., Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Vol. I, Sec. 375 (lOth ed.; Rochester, New York:
Lawyers Cooperative Publishing Company, 1955).
l3statement by Lowell J. Myers, personal interview,
May 15, 1972.
·
14 21 C.J.S. 217, Courts, Sec. 141, *cases cited.
15 Lee C. Deighton (ed.), Enc~cloEaedia of Education,
VI (New York: MacMillan Company an The Free Press, 1971),
p. 335.
.,..

-;

16Louisiana. Civil Code, Sec. 1591 (1870); and
57 Am. Jur. 73, Wills, Sec. 72.
1 7william Lloyd Prosser, The Handbook of the Law of
Torts (2d ed; St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Company,
1955), pp. 371-72.
18Sherman G. Finesilver, Traffic Safety (Washington,
D.C.: National Safety Council, 1961).
l9Finesilver, Traffic

Safet~.

2 °Finesilver, Traffic

Safet~.

21 Finesilver, Traffic

Safet~.

22"It Always Happens to Somebody Else, 11 Redbook
Magazine, February, 1949, pp. 35-39 and 107-109 .
. 23statement by Betty Edwards, President, F~orida.
Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf, personal ~nterv~ew,
May 10, 1972.
24A. E. Harum, "Remolding of Connnon Law Defamation,"
American Bar Association Journal, IL (February, 1963), 149.
25Exhibit A, Motion for a new trial, In re Adoption
of Scott James Richardson, 251 Cal. App. 22r-(~66).
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26Lawrence, Is Justice Deaf?, pp. 1-4 .
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